THE Committee wishes to express its profound appreciation to President Goodluck Jonathan, GCFR, for reposing confidence in members by according them the privilege and honour to serve.
We equally appreciate the role of Senator Anyim Pius Anyim, GCON, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) in facilitating the work of the Committee, through his invaluable support and assistance without which it would have been practically impossible to accomplish the task.
We also appreciate the invaluable contributions and support of Mr. Ferdinand Agu, the Senior Special Assistant to the President (Research and Documentation), Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation.
The gratitude of the Committee also goes to all the Governors, the people and Governments of all the states visited in the course of the nationwide consultations, for their tremendous support and cooperation.
Similarly, the support and contributions of the Honourable Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Sen. Abdulkadir Bala Muhammad for the success of the Abuja consultations are appreciated.
Equally important and worthy of appreciation are the contributions of media houses/organisations throughout the country for their massive coverage of the Committee’s activities. In particular, the roles played by the NTA, AIT, TV Continental, Channels Television, FRCN, and other local and international electronic media organisations, as well as print media are all appreciated.
The hospitality of the staff and management of the International Conference Centre (ICC) also contributed to the successful completion of the Committee’s assignment. The conducive environment provided was invaluable.
The roles played by the supporting staff of the Secretariat were exemplary and exceptional in the achievement of the Committee’s task. Those in this category include:
i. Mr. Mustapha Lawal Suleiman-Director Admin
ii. Mr. Salisu Na’inna -Director Information
iii. Mr. John A. Owoicho-Deputy Director Admin
iv. Mr. Sani Abdulahi -SA – Committee Sec.
v. Mr. Abia I. Bassey -Chief Admin. Officer
vi. Mr. Yusuf Mohammed-Chief Admin Officer
vii. Miss Anuli Onwuteaka-Legal Officer
viii. Mr. Sarumi Shola -Protocol Officer
ix. Mr. Hassan Ahmad-Accountant
x. Mrs. Priscilla C. Chinomso-Admin Officer
xi. Comrade Tosin Adeyanju-ICT Consultant
xii. Mr. Linus Njoku -Security
xiii. Mr. Joseph Ikyaator-Security
xiv. Mr. Hyacinth Elekwachi-Driver
xv. Mr. Fakorede John-Driver
xvi. Malam Mustapha Yakubu M-Driver
xvii. Mr. Segun Ayoola-Protocol Officer
Finally, the Committee recognises with appreciation, the contributions of all the Resources Persons and Conference Assistants.
Executive Summary
THE President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, GCFR, during his Independence Day broadcast on October 1, 2013 informed Nigerians that he had set up a 13-Member Presidential Advisory Committee on National Dialogue under Senator Dr. Femi Okurounmu.
The Committee, which was inaugurated on 7th October 2013, was mandated to advise Government on the framework of a national dialogue by consulting widely with Nigerians.
It was asked to come up with an appropriate name/nomenclature for the proposed national dialogue. The Committee was given seven (7) terms of reference and was asked to submit its report in six (6) weeks.
In compliance with the Presidential directive for members of the Committee to consult widely, the Committee held interactive sessions with Nigerians in 13 major cities across the country — two in each Geo-Political Zone and the Federal Capital, Abuja.
It also interacted with the Governors and traditional rulers of the 12 States visited as well as with the Honourable Minister of FCT.
A total of 6,650 Nigerians participated in the interactive sessions, 421 presentations were made and 607 memoranda received at the interactive sessions, while 57 memoranda were received online and 47 by direct submission to the Secretariat.
The Committee recommends that, the proposed national dialogue should be called ‘The National Conference.’
In response to the terms of reference number one (ToR1), the Committee recommends, with regards to the agenda, that the National Conference shall have no, no-go-area but specifically recommended a 38-item agenda, which is by no means exhaustive.
With regards to ToR2, the Committee recommends the setting up of a 13-member Conference Management Secretariat under an Executive Secretary with 2 members from each Geo-Political Zone.
The Secretariat shall run the affairs of the National Conference and supervise the elections to the Conference using the INEC Register. It shall also manage all activities and processes of the Conference at all levels.
The Committee also recommends that majority of the Delegates to the Conference shall be elected directly on the principles of universal adult suffrage.
The size and structure of the National Conference should be in accordance with the 360 constituencies of the House of Representatives although Government may consider the option of using the constituencies of the Senate but each Senatorial District shall send 4 elected Delegates to the Conference.
In addition, every State Government shall nominate one (1) Delegate and the President, through the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, shall nominate one (1) Delegate for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
In the event that any State fails to nominate a Delegate, the President shall nominate a Delegate for the said State.
The National Conference shall also have a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson, who should be persons of high unimpeachable integrity.
In response to ToR3, the Committee recommends that the President should nominate representatives from among the key interest groups in active consultation with them. In this context, the interest groups themselves should nominate to the President their representatives to the National Conference.
The Committee, however, recommends that the total number of nominated Delegates should not exceed one-third of the total number of Delegates.
As for ToR4, the Committee recommends that the National Conference should hold for a period of not less than three (3) months and not more than six (6) months.
Government may consider convening the National Conference in the year 2014 possibly between the months of February and July, thus concluding the exercise before the onset of the 2015 electioneering campaigns.
With regards to ToR5, the Executive and the National Assembly should cooperate as partners to put in place an enabling law that should lead to a successful and hitch-free National Dialogue.
In that context, the Committee recommends that the President should send an Executive Bill for the purpose of the National Conference to the National Assembly, which shall enact it into the enabling law. The Committee is convinced that, on balance of probability, it is safer to have such an enabling law, than to assume it is not needed.
In the alternative to the above, the President may exercise his inherent powers under Section 5 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999, as Amended), to convene the Conference.
With regards to ToR6, the Committee recommends that the National Conference itself should be saddled with the responsibility of setting out the said legal procedures and options for integrating the decisions and outcomes of the National Conference into the Constitution and Laws of the nation.
In response to ToR7, the Committee made some recommendations contained in Chapter Ten of this Report.
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, GCFR, during his Independence Day broadcast on October 1, 2013 informed Nigerians that he had set up a Presidential Advisory Committee on National Dialogue with the Following composition.
1. Senator Dr. Femi Okurounmu-Chairman
2. Dr. Akilu Sani Indabawa -Member/Secretary
3. Senator Khairat Abdulrazaq-Gwadabe-Member
4. Senator Timothy Adudu -Member
5. Professor Olufunke Adeboye-Member
6. Professor George A. Obiozor-Member
7. Professor Ben Nwabueze, SAN, NNOM-Member
8. Dr. Abubakar Siddique Mohammed-Member
9. Malam Bukhari Bello, MFR, mni-Member
10. Mr. Tony I. Uranta -Member
11. Col. Tony Nyiam (Rtd) -Member
12. Alhaji Dauda Birmah, OFR -Member
13. Dr. Mrs. Mairo Ahmed Amshi, FRM2, MFR-Member
1.2 Inauguration of the Committee: The Committee, which President Goodluck Jonathan said comprised ‘Nigerians with wide experience from various disciplines,’ was officially inaugurated in the Council Chamber, State House, Presidential Villa, Abuja, on Monday, 7th October, 2013. The Committee was given six (6) weeks to complete its assignment.
1.3 Foundation Principles: In his inaugural address to the Committee, President Goodluck Jonathan described the formation of this Committee as ‘a child of necessity.’ He stated the ‘foundational principles that drive the action’ of constituting the Committee to work towards convening a national conversation.
He emphasised that, ‘this is a National Project, a sincere and fundamental undertaking, aimed at realistically examining and genuinely resolving, long-standing impediments to our cohesion and harmonious development as a truly United Nations.’
The President further stressed that, ‘sitting down to talk is one right step in calming down tensions and channeling our grievances, misgivings and suggestions into more positive use for the good of our country.’
1.4 The President further stated that Nigerians are already talking about their national problems through the print and electronic media. He suggested that, ‘the only thing is that while these talks are sometimes weighty, they often lack direction. This Committee is to lend weight and direction to this national conversation.’
He also allayed ‘the fears of those who think the Conference will call the integrity of Nigeria into question,’ and added that, ‘this National Discourse will strengthen our union and address issues that are often on the front burner, and are too frequently ignored.’
1.5 Mr. President charged the Committee members ‘to consult widely before sitting down to develop the framework that will guide and guard the proceedings of the discussions.’
He reminded members of the Committee that, ‘no voice is too small and no option is irrelevant,’ urging the Committee to carry along the views of both enthusiasts and sceptics alike.
He urged them to bear in mind, ‘that what we desire is what can work for the good of our people and country’ and concluded that, ‘the goal is to bequeath a better and a greater Nigeria to the present and the generations to come.’
1.6 Terms of Reference: The Committee was given the following terms reference:
1. To consult with all relevant stakeholders with a view to drawing up a feasible agenda for the proposed national dialogue/conference;
2. To make recommendations to Government on structure and modalities for the proposed national dialogue/conference;
3. To make recommendations to Government on how representation of various interest groups at the national dialogue/conference will be determined;
4. To advise Government on a time-frame for the national dialogue/conference;
5. To advise Government on a legal framework for the national dialogue/conference;
6. To advise on legal procedures and options for integrating decisions and outcomes of the national dialogue/conference into the Constitution and Laws of the nation; and
7. To advise Government on any other matter that may be related or incidental to the proposed national dialogue.
1.8 Inaugural Meeting and Take-off of the Committee: The Committee started its assignment a few hours after its inauguration on Monday, 7th October, 2013 at the Transcorp Hilton, Abuja. Its inaugural meeting was held and several other meetings followed thereafter, throughout the first week of the Committee’s assignment.
In that first week, the Committee deliberated on the methodology it would employ in carrying out its assignment and drew up a Work Plan for the accomplishment of its mandate.
1.9 The Secretariat of the Committee used the first week to put in place the administrative machinery required for the discharge of the Committee’s mandate.
1.10 Work Plan and Strategy: The Committee deliberated extensively on the strategies to guide its work, on the basis of which, it designed a Work Plan (Appendix 2).
Based on the Work Plan, the Committee then worked out an Itinerary for holding of Interactive Sessions at Thirteen (13) Centres across the country — two in each Geo-Political Zone and the Federal Capital, Abuja, as well as other strategies for carrying out the assignment.
1.11 Slight Change in the Committee’s Composition: The composition of the Committee was slightly changed. Professor Ben Nwabueze (SAN, NNOM), whose name was on the original list of members up to the time the Committee was inaugurated, was not available to serve because of health challenges. He was subsequently replaced by Professor Anya O. Anya (FAS, OFR, NNOM).
Another change was in respect of Col. Tony Nyiam (Rtd) who was replaced by Solomon Asemota Esq. (SAN) following an incident, which took place during the Committee’s Interactive Session in Benin City.
A section of the participants at that Interactive Session took exception to a comment by Governor Adams Oshiomhole that the proposed Conference would not be different from previous ones the resolutions of which were not implemented. They started booing him and made it impossible for him to continue with his speech.
Col. Nyiam then interrupted the Governor. This led to some commotion and eventually the Committee was advised to call off the meeting. A meeting of the Committee was held to address this incident. Members expressed their displeasure at Col. Nyiam’s behaviour. He resigned and was replaced by Solomon Asemota Esq. (SAN).
Chapter Two
Historical Background
2.1 The survey covers the colonial and post-colonial periods during which several constitutional arrangements were made in the country. Colonial constitutions included the Clifford Constitution (1922), Richards Constitution (1946), Macpherson Constitution (1951), Lythleton Constitution (1954), and the Independence Constitution (1960).
Post-colonial attempts included the 1963 Republican Constitution, the 1979 Constitution, the 1999 Constitution, and a few other drafts that were not given official ratification.
2.2 The integrity and acceptance of any Constitution depend on two elements, namely, process and content. Process has to do with issues of consultation and popular participation in the course of setting up the constitutional arrangements. Debates, negotiations and compromise are all considered healthy for the process.
Content deals with the body of articles and key provisions in the Constitution. If either of these elements is perceived as being unrepresentative of people’s wishes, the Constitution is considered unsatisfactory and defective.
The context in which a Constitution is made is also important in determining whether due consultations would be made or whether its key provisions would promote the interest of the people.
2.3 Not all colonial constitutions passed this test. Again, it is doubtful if this could have been otherwise given the unequal power relations between colonial authorities and their subjects.
The Clifford Constitution of 1922 and Richards Constitution of 1946 were both regarded as colonial impositions. Richards Constitution was particularly criticised because there was already a pool of articulate elite in the country who felt excluded from the process.
Colonial authorities tried to redress this by convening constitutional conference before subsequent constitutions were introduced. Perhaps, the best illustration of this is the Macpherson Constitution that was preceded by extensive consultations. There were village level meetings, district meetings, provincial meetings and regional conferences.
The last stage was the National Conference held in Ibadan in 1950. The result of this was the Macpherson Constitution, which became operative in 1951.
However, by 1953 — just two years later — there were already calls for revisions in this 1951 arrangement. The reason for this could be found in the intersection between constitutional content and prevailing political/ideological climate.
As the political environment was rapidly changing with accelerated impetus for increasing regional autonomy and self-rule, the two-year-old constitutional arrangement suddenly became outdated.
2.4 Again, in terms of content, the piecemeal or incremental approach that characterised the provisions of previous colonial constitutions was no longer acceptable in the 1950s. For instance, even though amalgamation of the Northern and Southern provinces was in 1914, it was the Richards Constitution that provided for a single legislative authority for the entire country in 1946.
Prior to this time, the Legislative Council covered only the South while the North was ruled by proclamations issued by the Governor. It thus took 32 years for the North and South to be brought under the same legislative coverage.
Another example was incremental participation of Nigerians at both the legislative and executive levels. Clifford’s Constitution in 1922 provided for four elected members — three from Lagos and one from Calabar in a Legislative Council that comprised 19 unofficial and 27 official members.
It took 27 years for elected majorities to emerge in the central legislature and regional Houses of Assembly through the instrumentality of the 1951 Constitution.
Similarly, the same Constitution provided for 9 officials in the Regional Executive Council and 9 Nigerian Ministers. The Central Executive Council of Ministers had 7 officials, including the Governor as President and 12 Nigerian Ministers (four from each Region). Meanwhile, the first Nigerian member of the Executive Council was appointed 1943.
2.5 By the 1950s, nationalists were impatient to take over power. This decade, compared with previous decades, afforded them significant legislative experience before independence in 1960. They also got several opportunities to participate, within a framework set up by colonial authorities, in constitutional arrangements through the various constitutional conferences and talks that took place within the decade (1954, 1957/58, in London). The eventual outcome of all these was the Independence Constitution of 1960.
2.6 Post-colonial constitutions had a different orientation in terms of process and content. Apart from the 1963 Republican Constitution, others such as the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions were made within the context of military administrations.
Even then, the military still made some attempts to give some semblance of consultation to their constitution-making processes. Here, the case of the 1979 Constitution is particularly apposite.
The process commenced in 1975 when the Murtala Muhammed regime appointed a 49-member Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), headed by Chief Rotimi Williams, to produce a draft constitution, which was to serve as the main working document for the Constituent Assembly (CA) that later emerged in 1977.
The CA comprised 232 members elected indirectly by an electoral college constituted at the local councils. The CA examined and debated the draft constitution extensively. After final ratification by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the Constitution was promulgated in 1979.
As far as the military regime was concerned, the inclusion of the CA within the exercise had legitimised the process.
2.7 Similarly, General Sani Abacha, through Decree No.1 of 1994, established a Constitutional Conference. Of the 369 members, 273 were elected by the populace in a non-partisan election, while 96 were nominated by government. Headed by Justice A.G. Karibi-Whyte, the conference produced a draft constitution, which was submitted in 1995.
After the death of General Abacha in 1998, his successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, set up a 25-member Constitution Debate Coordination Committee to amend the 1995 draft. The 1999 Constitution eventually grew out of this exercise and was ratified by the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of the military regime.
Despite the attempts made by the military authorities to involve some sections of the populace in constitution making, these two constitutions (1979 and 1999) are still regarded by the Nigerian elite as impositions by military regimes.
In between these two exercises were other attempts made during the administration of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. There was a Political Bureau set up under the leadership of S.J. Cookey to conduct a national debate on the political future of the country and propose a “viable and enduring people-oriented political system devoid of perennial disruptions.” The Bureau submitted its recommendations in March 1987.
The second was a Constitutional Review Committee set up to review the 1979 Constitution. The result of this review was the 1989 Constitution. It was not ratified but portions of it were promulgated as Decrees.
2.8 Next is the issue of the content of post-colonial constitutions. The general trend in these constitutions is that they tend to build on and strengthen existing principles in previous constitutions or where there are contentious issues, try to resolve them.
In other words, a new constitution is designed to improve on some areas or attend to matters arising from a previous constitution, which serves as its point of reference.
Technically, therefore, the idea of a ‘brand new’ constitution that owes nothing to its predecessor is difficult to envisage (except, perhaps, in a new state where no such ‘predecessor’ existed).
The 1963 Republican Constitution, for instance, like the 1960 Constitution was based on the Westminster system of government. The key differences were in the provisions for a ceremonial President in place of the Queen of England, and that the judicial appeal system should terminate with the Supreme Court and not the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council.
2.9 In cases where previous constitutional arrangements were regarded as the cause of socio-political instability and crises, the new constitutions tended to focus on resolving these issues through a revised arrangement, but with the old constitution as reference point.
For example, the breakdown of the First Republic was attributed to conflicts arising from regional politics, ethnic domination, minority oppression, etc. To resolve this, the 1979 Constitution abandoned the Westminster system in favour of the Presidential system with a directly elected executive.
To further avoid the pitfalls of the First Republic, political parties and cabinet positions were to reflect a new “Federal Character” principle. Political parties were to be broad-based and not regional.
Again, while the First Republic Senate was a ceremonial body, the 1979 Constitution gave the Senate and House of Representatives coequal powers. The 1999 Constitution, in most respects, still bears a strong resemblance to the 1979 Constitution in terms of its key structures.
2.10 This brief survey has underscored the significance of process and content in constitution making in Nigeria. This observation is equally applicable elsewhere. Consultative and participatory processes are seen to be ideal because these allow for negotiations and compromise and help foster a sense of ownership.
Unfortunately, in Nigeria, this has not always been enjoyed. Colonial constitutions can hardly be described as growing out of “free debate” with no “no go” areas. Even the wide consultations that preceded the Macpherson Constitution and subsequent constitutions took place within a framework prescribed by colonial authorities. All issues were still subject to their approval.
Constitutions made within the military apparatus were equally considered unsatisfactory. The demand for new constitutional arrangement thus continues. The National Political Reform Conference set up in 2005 by General Olusegun Obasanjo produced a draft that was unpopular.
In 2012, the Justice S.M.A Belgore-led Presidential Committee on Review of Outstanding Issues from Recent Constitutional Conferences prepared a detailed report that is yet to be implemented. It is, therefore, anticipated that the proposed National Conference will constitute a viable landmark in the constitutional landscape of Nigeria.
2.11 State of the Nation: Since the military exited from power, there have been persistent calls for the reform of the political system in such a manner to command the respect of Nigerians and be seen to be fair, just and equitable.
With appropriate structures, leadership and other national problems — inter-elite rivalries, reciprocal suspicion, hostility of position and status conflicts among Nigerian elite, mutually reinforcing cleavages — could be reasonably managed through the democratic process.
In this regard, Nigeria needs a system of shared power, bearing in mind that political institutions make it difficult for reckless and lawless political adventures to thrive.
The choice before the country is either to stick with our present political arrangement, which favour over centralisation of governance and resources or to recognise our irrepressible pluralism and the necessity for voluntary integration. Coercive integration — or integration by force or by intimidation — has failed all over the world, including Africa.
2.12 The persistent call for “true federalism” is nothing but a call for decentralisation and devolution of power. It is expected that decentralisation would redeem the country from its constant perennial fluctuation between social crises and chronic political instability and threats of disintegration.
No amount of government-sponsored propaganda and jingles can really make up for a defective political structure or for institutional and leadership failures.
2.13 Federalism, in essence is simply “a contractual non-centralisation” involving structural dispersion of power among many centres the legitimate authority of which is constitutionally guaranteed.
Hence, entrenched diffusion of power or division of power among levels of government remains the principle characteristics and argument for federal democracy. It becomes therefore clear that when one speaks of federalism, one means coordinate supremacy of the levels of government with regards to their respective functions.
Certainly in this context, the “golden rule” of federalism, as stipulated by scholars and political analysts, has been constantly ignored or breached in Nigeria over the years. Nigeria has also ignored the important aspect of the equilibrium between the centre and the regions in classical federalism.
2.14 Recognising this reality, the Belgore Report recommended:
a. Reduction of Power at the Centre and devolution of same to the federating units.
b. Allow the centre to retain necessary powers to enable it exercise its sovereignty.
c. Enable the centre to act for the federating units in the area of common and mutually beneficial interest and service.
2.15 In fact, before and after independence, a long before the Belgore Report, other spirited efforts by previous regimes, military or civilian, have tried to address this critical national issue. The first military coup in January 1966 addressed the restructuring process by stating, in Decree 24 below:
“Subject to the provisions of this Decree, Nigeria shall on 2nd May 1966 (in this Decree referred to as the appointed day) cease to be a federation and shall accordingly as from that day be a Republic, by the name of Republic of Nigeria, consisting of the territory which immediately before that day was comprised in the Federation.”
2.16 The Decree sought to unify the federal civil service, and re-organise the regions into groups of provinces. And in addition to other grievances following, the January 15 coup made the counter-coup inevitable. And in his maiden address to the nation, General Gowon recognised the enormity of the tragedy that had befallen Nigeria as a result of the two coups within six months.
He said: “Suffice it to say that, putting all considerations to test — political, economic, as well as social — the base of unity is not there or is badly rocked, not only once but several times. I therefore feel that we should review the issue of our National standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction.”
2.17 Consequently, among the first acts of General Gowon in office was the pardon and release of Chief Obafemi Awolowo from prison on August 2nd 1967.
And another significant effort he made to arrest the deteriorating political conditions in the country was the appointment of the Ad Hoc constitutional conference in Lagos on September 12, 1966.
In a rather spirited speech to the delegates of the conference, Gowon said that only two things should be ruled out: complete break-up, and a unitary form of government.
“I therefore put before you the following forms of government for consideration.
a. Federal system with a strong Central Government;
b. Federal system with a weak Central Government;
c. Confederation; or
d. An entirely new arrangement which will be peculiar to Nigeria and which has not yet found its way into any political dictionary.”
2.18 However, General Gowon’s regime was overthrown by General Murtala Muhammed in July 29, 1975, in the country’s 3rd successful military coup and the first bloodless coup in Nigeria’s history.
General Muhammed’s regime began an active role towards returning power to civilians and on October 18, 1975, he set up the Constitution Drafting Committee. In his address, General Muhammed informed them that the Supreme Military Council was “committed to a federal system of government, and a free democratic and lawful system of government which guarantees ‘fundamental human rights’ and urged them to work for the creation of viable political institutions which will ensure maximum participation and consensus and orderly succession to political power.”
Considering our recent political experience, any constitution devised should seek to:
a. Eliminate cut-throat political competition based on a system or rules of winner-takes-all. As a corollary, it should discourage electoral malpractices.
b. It should also discourage institutionalised opposition to the government in power and instead, develop consensus politics and government based on community of all interests rather than interests of a section of the country.
c. … As a matter of principle, decentralise power wherever possible as a means of diffusing tensions…”
2.19 In fact, from the formation of political parties, NCNC (1948) NPC (1951) AG (1951) to Enahoro’s Self Government Motion in 1953, the national attention and political controversies have trailed the debate on an appropriate political structure for Nigeria.
2.20 Today, resolving Nigeria’s national dilemma over structure and Constitution has become urgent and must be our priority.
TO BE CONTINUED TOMORROW
Source: Guardian
